Reputational concerns with altruistic providers by Olivella, Pau & Siciliani, Luigi
Reputational Concerns with Altruistic Providers
Pau Olivellay Luigi Sicilianiz
July 6, 2017
Abstract
We study a model of reputational concerns when doctors di¤er in their degree
of altruism and they can signal their altruism by their (observable) quality. When
reputational concerns are high, following the introduction or enhancement of public
reporting, the less altruistic (bad) doctor mimics the more altruistic (good) doctor.
Otherwise, either a separating or a semi-separating equilibrium arises: the bad doctor
mimics the good doctor with probability less than one. Pay-for-performance incentive
schemes are unlikely to induce crowding out, unless some dimensions of quality are
unobservable. Under the pooling equilibrium a purchaser can implement the rst-best
quality by appropriately choosing a simple payment scheme with a xed price per unit
of quality provided. This is not the case under the separating equilibrium. Therefore,
policies that enhance public reporting complement pay-for-performance schemes.
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1 Introduction
A key policy issue in the health sector is how to incentivise providers (eg doctors, hospitals)
to improve care. Providers have two sources of motivation: monetary and non-monetary
ones. Monetary incentives include pay-for-performance incentive schemes: for example,
hospitals are paid a price for each patient treated; family doctors can be nancially re-
warded if they have better quality indicators. Non-monetary incentives can be equally
important and include two other incentive forces. First, providers may be altruistic and
care about patientswell-being. Altruism motivates them to provide better quality and
has long been recognised in the health economics literature (Ellis and McGuire, 1986;
Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). Second, providers care about what other people (their
family, the community, their peers, other patients; henceforth society) think about them.
Policymakers increasingly publish, and make available to patients and the general public,
information on doctorsperformance. Examples include the scheme "QualityCounts" in
Wisconsin which compares adverse events in hospitals (Hibbard et al., 2005); the Hos-
pital Quality Alliance, which encourages public hospital reporting for a minimum of ten
quality measures regarding three clinical conditions (Lindenauer et al., 2007); and report
cards for coronary bypass in Pennsylvania and New York State (Dranove et al., 2003).1
Such policies can potentially enhance reputational concerns by more widely advertising
the performing doctors and the under-performing ones; they are sometimes (colloquially)
known as name and shame schemes, where poorly performing doctors are subjected to
shame in front of the community. Although reputational incentives have been recognised
in the general economics literature (eg Benabou and Tirole, 2006 and 2011) we are not
aware that they have been applied specically to doctors and health care providers. This
study lls this gap.
Can the simple fact of publishing information change doctorsbehaviour? If so, which
doctors change their behaviour and in which direction? Do patients and doctors gain from
such policies? This study investigates the extent to which name and shame policies can
enhance reputational concerns and induce some doctors to provide more quality to avoid a
reputational damage. Health systems di¤er in the extent to which they compare and report
quality in the public domain. They can vary from a small to a large set of indicators. They
can report quality at organisation level (practice, hospital) or at individual doctor level,
the latter exposing the doctors more directly. They can post indicators on a website, or
more proactively disseminate the indicators by publishing them in newspapers. Variations
in reporting generates variations in doctors reputational concern. We investigate the
e¤ects of such variations in reputational concerns induced by di¤erent intensity of quality
1Analogous schemes have been implemented in other countries, sometimes in combination with pay-for-
performance schemes, such as Brazil, Estonia, Korea, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (see Cashin
et al., 2014, p. 44-51).
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reporting. In our model doctors di¤er in altruism and care about their own reputation:
they enjoy being known by society as good doctors, and dislike being known as bad doctors.
The analysis is distinct from the literature on nancial incentives of healthcare providers
since name and shame policies do not involve any direct payment, and instead require a
signalling model to investigate how reputation is created in the rst place.
We also investigate other policy relevant questions. First, we study whether a more
extensive use of monetary incentives such as pay-for-performance schemes crowds out or
crowds in the non-monetary incentives. Second, we investigate whether the benets from
publishing and disseminating information also arise within a multi-tasking framework
when doctors provide di¤erent dimensions of quality, some of which are unobservable
(eg diagnostic e¤ort). Third, we investigate whether there is still scope for publishing
and disseminating information on quality even when the purchaser (a health authority
or a health insurer) can design a pay-for-performance scheme which pays a xed price
for each unit of quality provided. Since our focus is an applied one, we restrict the
instruments which are available to the purchaser to linear performance contracts, since
they are commonly used by policymakers.
Our model predicts that policies that publicise doctorsperformance may be virtuous.
By increasing reputational concerns, name and shame policies induce the bad doctor to
mimic the higher quality provided by the good doctor. Whether the introduction of a
pay-for-performance scheme crowds out or crowds in the non-monetary incentives is in
principle indeterminate. Higher prices increase the good doctors performance, and make
more costly for the bad doctor to mimic the good doctor, which favours crowding out.
But higher prices also increase overall revenues when performance is high, and make more
attractive for the bad doctor to mimic the good doctor, which favours crowding in. We
show that whether crowding in or crowding out arises ultimately depends on whether the
good doctor provides proportionally lower or higher quality compared with the bad doctor
in the absence of reputational payo¤s. If the marginal benet is decreasing, then under
some regularity conditions on third-order derivatives of costs, the good doctor provides
proportionally lower quality and crowding in arises.
Therefore, policies that introduce a pay-for-performance scheme do not seem to be in
conict with the introduction of report cards. However, this conclusion holds only if quality
can be observed by patients and society. If some dimensions of quality cannot be observed
(ie in the presence of multitasking), then name and shame policies can induce the bad
doctor to crowd out non-observable dimensions of quality, and potentially reduce patients
benet. Although crowding out is also found in the multitasking literature (Eggleston,
2005; Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011), name and shame policies are not exempt from this
issue: publishing in the public domain only a narrow set of quality indicators might
make such policies undesirable. Moreover, from a modelling point of view, we show that
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multitasking interacts with reputational concerns by increasing the scope for the pooling
equilibrium to arise. Name and shame policies make it easier for the bad doctor to mimic
the good doctor by saving costs on the unobservable quality.
As for the optimal design of simple pay-for-performance schemes, we show that a linear
contract which pays a xed price per unit of quality is su¢ cient to achieve allocative
e¢ ciency for all doctors only if reputational concerns are high: the payer can design
the incentive scheme aimed at the good doctor, and by pooling accomplishes e¢ ciency
of the bad doctor as well. This cannot arise for low reputational concerns unless more
sophisticated non-linear contracts are available to the purchaser (eg the purchaser can
o¤er a menu of contracts, which are not commonly observed in practice). Therefore, if
the purchaser is constrained by the use of a linear performance contract, policies which
publicize quality can make patients and purchasers better o¤ even when the payment
is optimally set. The result is relevant for policy and suggests that policies aimed at
disseminating quality indicators have a role even in the presence of pay-for-performance
schemes.
Our results are consistent with some empirical studies evaluating the e¤ects of publiciz-
ing performance reports. Hibbard et al. (2005) compare the evolution of quality standards
in obstetrics for (i) hospitals that had their reports made public; (ii) hospitals that received
the report privately; and (iii) hospitals that did not receive any report. These authors nd
that "[a]mong the eight public reporthospitals with [...] low scores at baseline, only one
had a worse-than-expected score two years later. In contrast, two-thirds of such hospitals
in the private reportgroup and almost as many in the no reportgroup still had worse-
than-expected scores two years later" (p. 1155). This suggests that hospitals with low
quality responded to their reports being made public by improving performance. Similarly,
Fichera et al. (2014) report in their survey that "[e]vidence from [the Hospital Quality
Incentive Demonstration] and [the Advancing Quality] initiatives suggests that providers
quickly converge to similar values on the process metrics and di¤erences in performance
must be measured at a very high level of precision to discriminate among providers." (p.
113) Wang et al. (2011) examine the impact of coronary bypass report cards. They nd
that poorly performing hospitals or surgeons responded with a reduction in volume, while
highly rated hospitals and surgeons did not respond.
1.1 Related Literature
The empirical and theoretical literature on altruism and intrinsic motivation is extensive.
Within the public and health economics literature the assumption of motivated agents
is commonly shared.2 Establishing that reputational concerns matter has also been in-
2Within the public economics literature, see Francois (2000), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Dixit (2005),
Lakdawalla and Philipson, (2006), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), Glazer (2004), Prendergast (2007), Makris
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vestigated. Some empirical evidence has quantied the e¤ects of publicizing performance
indicators, either in isolation (Hibbard et al., 2005) or when combined with other pay-
for-performance schemes (Lindenauer et al., 2007; see Roland and Dudley, 2015, for a
review).
However, few studies formally include the possibility that reputational concerns come
from society learning about doctorsaltruism from observed actions. These studies can
be classied into two groups. In the rst group, this e¤ect is either directly assumed in
the doctors payo¤ function (Siciliani, 2009) or comes about from the implicit assumption
that individuals with di¤erent altruism choose di¤erent actions (Bénabou and Tirole,
2006). In the second group, reputational concerns are explicitly modelled as a formal
signalling game. Bénabou and Tirole (2011) exploit a model which di¤ers from ours in
having a continuous type space and a dichotomous signal. Moreover, their focus is on
analyzing and comparing sources of crowding out that are very di¤erent from ours. Much
closer to our work are the studies by Jeitschko and Normann (2012), and Cartwright and
Patel (2013). These authors consider signals with continuous support and dichotomous
types. Jeitschko and Normann (2012), in an experimental game theory exercise, present
a model that is close to ours but more restrictive. Cartwright and Patel (2013) present a
model of fundraising and donations. However, they rule out the high-performance pooling
equilibrium by means of the "Intuitive criterion" (Cho and Kreps, 1987), which leads them
to focus on the so called "Riley Outcome" (Riley, 1979), which is a separating equilibrium
by construction. We instead propose a simpler equilibrium selection procedure, based on
more naive beliefs. In a nutshell, we rst posit that doctors choose to perform as if no
reputational concerns were present. Then we check whether they want to deviate from the
posited choice in the presence of reputational concerns. We provide su¢ cient conditions
under which our equilibrium outcome and beliefs pass the Intuitive Criterion test. We
also provide su¢ cient conditions under which the Riley Outcome is not a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Chen (2011) also investigates a signalling model where low-quality doctors
select patients with low severity to mimic high-quality doctors. He shows that if doctors
face the same distribution of patients types, low-quality doctors have no incentive to
select patients, while this arises when they face di¤erent distributions of patientstypes.
Rodriguez-Barraquer and Xu (2015) have agents seek promotion by choosing a di¢ cult
task. These authors also obtain a pooling equilibrium under some conditions.
Crowding out does arise in other settings. In Bénabou and Tirole (2006), nancial
rewards make it more di¢ cult for society to infer types from observed actions (see also
(2009) and Makris and Siciliani (2013). Within the health economics literature the analytically-similar
assumption of altruistic agents was introduced by Ellis and McGuire (1986), and then extended by Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998), Eggleston (2005), Jack (2005), Siciliani (2009), Choné and Ma (2011), Brekke,
Siciliani and Straume (2011, 2012), Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011), Siciliani, Straume and Cellini (2013) and
Kolstad (2013).
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Ariely et al., 2009). In psychology, in particular in Self Determination Theory, Ryan
and Deci (2000) propose that tangible rewards suppress the direct pleasure that ones
actions produce. In cases where the true objectives of the payer (or some aspect of the
environment) are unknown to agents, the mere fact that the principal introduces extrinsic
motivation may in itself (partly) reveal such information (see, for instance, Fehr and List,
2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Funk, 2007; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). This e¤ect is absent
in our analysis since doctors do not care about the payers type and are fully aware of the
impact their actions have on patientswell-being.
In Section 2 we present the model and characterize the equilibria. In Section 3 we
investigate if pecuniary incentives generate crowding out or crowding in. In Section 4 we
extend the model to a multitasking environment. In Section 5 we characterize the optimal
(linear) remuneration contract. In Section 6 we provide conditions for our equilibrium
to pass the Intuitive Criterion test and for the Riley outcome not being an equilibrium.
Section 7 discusses some extensions, and Section 8 concludes. Technical derivations are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
The players are a doctor, a third-party payer (a public or private insurer), and society
(patients, their family and friends, doctors peers). Dene q as the quality of care received
by the patients. Doctors are altruistic and di¤er in the degree of altruism, which can
take two values  2 ; 	 with  < , and is private information. We refer to the more
altruistic provider as the good doctor, and to the less altruistic provider as the bad doctor.
The prior probability that the doctor is good is common knowledge and equal to   0.
Both types have the same costs of delivering quality, C(q), with Cq > 0 and Cqq  0.
These costs are the sum of the monetary and non-monetary ones (eg diagnostic e¤ort and
opportunity costs of time spent with the patient).
Although we interpret q as quality, it can be interpreted more broadly as intensity
of care. Under the latter interpretation we allow the marginal benet of q to become
negative for high intensity of care (as in Ellis and McGuire, 1986). Formally, patients
derive benets W (q), with Wq(q)  0 if q  bq, Wq(q)  0 if q  bq; and Wqq  0. The
marginal benet is negative if unnecessary tests, X-rays, or drugs with side e¤ects and no
health gains are prescribed. For brevity we refer to q as quality in the rest of the paper.
Patients observe quality and use that observation to update their beliefs on the doctors
type, ie to decide whether the doctor is good. We denote these (posterior) beliefs as S ,
which is the probability that the doctor is good after having observed quality. We denote
the expected type of a doctor by S = S+
 
1  S . If there is no updating, then the
expected type is the expected type in doctorspopulation (S = ). If updating is such
6
that the doctor is good (bad), then the expected type is  () and S = 1 (S = 0).
Doctors preferences are represented by a linear and additively separable utility func-
tion over money, altruism and reputation. The revenues are given by T + pq, where T
is a xed budget (or lump-sum payment) and p is a bonus for additional quality (eg as
part of a pay-for-performance scheme).3 His prots are  (q) = T + pq   C(q). We also
assume that doctors have limited liability and that the purchaser cannot use a contract
(or a menu of contracts) that species a transfer conditioned on a given quality (see also
Section 5 on optimal contracting).
Similarly to Ellis and McGuire (1986) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), altruism is
expressed as a fraction of patientsbenets, W (q), and the doctor cares about patients
wellbeing (Andreoni, 1989).  can alternatively be interpreted as intrinsic motivation
(Dixit, 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2005). The sum of the rst two components gives the
non-reputational payo¤ dened as
V (q) = (q) + W (q): (1)
The reputational concerns convey that the doctor cares about societys impression of
his own altruism, and come from the composition of two elements. The rst element
  0 (1 + 2) measures how intensely society, or the doctor himself, takes into account
this impression. The parameter 0 is determined by societys preferences (how much
society cares about altruism) or the doctors own preferences (how much he cares about
what others think of him). 1 measures the number of people who directly learn, without
any policy intervention, about the quality of his care through family, friends, word of
mouth, and social networks.
2 is a key policy parameter and captures the extent to which policymakers can change
and amplify reputational concerns by publishing and disseminating quality reports. Low
levels of 2 are associated with health systems with limited or no quality reports; reporting
is at higher organisation level; and there are limited e¤orts to disseminate information. In
contrast, high levels of 2 are associated with health systems which publish an extensive
range of quality indicators; the reporting is at the individual doctor level, which exposes
3Examples include the Medicare Programme in the United States, which nancially rewards hospitals
that do well according to measurable quality indicators, such as rates of cervical cancer screening and
haemoglobin testing for diabetic patients (Rosenthal et al., 2005). In the United Kingdom, general prac-
titioners performing well on certain quality indicators, such as the measurement of blood pressure and
cholesterol in patients with ischemic heart disease, can receive substantial nancial rewards (up to 20% of
revenues, Doran et al., 2006). Hospitals receive Best Practice Tari¤s for a selection of conditions, such as
hip fracture and stroke. An additional payment is provided, on top of a basic DRG tari¤, conditional on
performance related to a process measure of quality (e.g. rapid brain imaging or being treated in a stroke
unit). Rosenthal et al. (2004) provide 36 other examples of pay-for-performance programs in the United
States. Similar initiatives are under discussion in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and
Spain (Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2010).
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them more directly; and the quality reports are widely disseminated through websites,
newspapers, and leaets. The aim of this section is to investigate how changes in the
policy design of public reporting a¤ects doctors behaviour through changes in reputational
concerns.
The second element of the reputational concerns is how societys impression is deter-
mined. This is given by the di¤erence between the conditional expectation of altruism
given an observed quality, S (q), and the expected altruism, E () =  + (1  ) . It
is consistent with the idea that if no new information is revealed, the doctors reputation
remains the same. If all doctors provide the same quality, quality is not informative and
there is no reputational gain or loss. If observing some (low) quality generates posterior
beliefs that the doctor is bad, then the reputational payo¤ is negative. To sum up, doctors
preferences are
V (q) + (s (q)  E ()): (2)
We dene the non-reputational optimum quality q () as the optimal quality of doctor
 facing no reputational concerns (when  = 0), which maximises V (q j ) and satises
p + Wq = Cq; so that the marginal benet from quality due to monetary and altruistic
concerns is equal to the marginal cost.
Our equilibrium concept is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE, see Appendix 1 for
a formal denition). As it is usually the case, the fact that the PBE notion does not restrict
beliefs for actions out of equilibrium leads to a plethora of PBE. We therefore restrict
beliefs to satisfy the following two properties: (1) [Monotonicity] Beliefs on altruism are
not decreasing in quality; (2) [Pessimism] Beliefs for out-of-equilibrium actions are the most
pessimistic. Monotonicity and Pessimism imply that society does not raise its beliefs that
the doctor is good when observing quality levels that are higher than the quality chosen
by the good doctor in equilibrium.4 Even imposing monotonicity and pessimism, there
is still a large multiplicity of PBEs. The literature has often used the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987) to restrict out of equilibrium beliefs. Rather than applying this
criterion directly, we focus on equilibria where the good doctor chooses the quality which
maximises his non-reputational payo¤, and the bad doctor may mimic such quality. In
Section 6 we provide conditions under which this equilibrium passes the Intuitive Criterion
test. We now characterise the parameter values which sustain a separating, a pooling and
a semi-separating equilibrium, respectively.
Separating equilibrium. The good doctor provides the higher quality, qE
 


= q
 


and the bad doctor provides the lower quality qE () = q (). Beliefs are such that
observing a high (low) quality signals with certainty high (low) altruism. The good doctor
never has an incentive to mimic the bad doctor, while the bad doctor has no incentive to
4Monotonicity in beliefs does not imply that the benet function is monotonic and increasing in quality.
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mimic the good doctor if the reputational gains are low (Appendix 1):
0     = V (q
() j )  V (q   j ))
    . (3)
The parameter  has an intuitive interpretation: it conveys the cost of the bad doctor
of disguising as a good doctor. In terms of payo¤s, the good doctor enjoys an increase in
reputation and has the payo¤ V (q() j ) + (   E ()); while the bad doctor su¤ers a
loss of reputation and has the payo¤ V (q() j )  (E ()  ).
Pooling equilibrium. Suppose that both doctors choose the high quality: qE () = q()
for all . Since doctors provide the same quality, patients (and society) cannot distinguish
between good and bad doctors. There is therefore no updating in beliefs about altruism
after observing the high quality, and the expected altruism is the average one. The good
doctor never has an incentive to mimic the bad doctor. The bad doctor has an incentive
to mimic the good doctor if the reputational gains are high (Appendix 1):   =: No
type enjoys a reputation gain or loss, and equilibrium payo¤s are V (q() j ) for the good
doctor and V (q() j ) for the bad doctor. This is unsurprising since observing the high
quality is not informative. The bad doctor su¤ers a mimicking cost, which he is willing to
incur to avoid a reputation loss.
Semi-separating equilibrium. Finally, there is an empty intersection for intermediate
levels of reputational concerns, where neither the separating equilibrium nor the pooling
equilibrium exists. This empty intersection is due to the impossibility under the pooling
equilibrium for the bad doctor to capture the highest reputation gain. He must content
himself with avoiding a reputation loss. A semi-separating equilibrium arises for  <  <
=. The good doctor chooses the high quality qE
 


= q
 


. The bad doctor chooses
the low quality q () with probability rE = 1   [(= (1  )) ((  ) =)] < 1 and the
high quality q
 


with probability (1  rE).5 (See Appendix 1).
We summarise all results obtained so far with the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If reputational concerns are small (for 0    ), a separating equilib-
rium arises where the good doctor provides a higher quality than the bad doctor, qE
 


=
q
 


> qE () = q (). The good doctor enjoys a reputation gain while the bad doctor
su¤ers a reputation loss. If reputational concerns are high (for   =), a pooling equi-
5The equilibrium payo¤s for the good and bad doctor are, respectively, V (q
 

 j )+ (   )     
and V (q() j ) + (   )     . Hence the observation of low quality induces the sure belief that the
provider is a bad doctor and the consequent reputation loss. In contrast, the observation of high quality
is not fully informative. It could either come from a good doctor or a bad doctor mimicking the good
doctor. Upon the observation of high quality, the posterior probability that the doctor is good is larger
than the unconditional one (), and both doctors enjoy a reputation gain, which is small and equal to
(   )     , and decreasing in reputational concerns . The latter is not surprising since the bad
doctor tends to mimic with a higher probability when reputational concerns are larger.
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librium arises where both doctors choose a high quality, qE
 


= qE () = q
 


; and
neither type gains or loses any reputation. If reputational concerns are intermediate (for
 <  < =), a semi-separating equilibrium arises where the good doctor provides the high
quality and the bad doctor randomizes between high and low quality. In the latter equi-
librium, the expected quality of the bad doctor increases with the intensity of reputational
concerns. Payo¤s decrease with the intensity of reputational concerns.
The proposition generates the following key policy insight. Consider a policy which
amplies reputational concerns from low to high. For example, before the policy i) there
is limited availability or no quality reporting; ii) the reporting, if it occurs, is at a higher
organisation level so that doctors do not feel directly exposed to this information; and iii)
the reports are not widely disseminated. After the policy, i) there is a plethora of quality
reports; ii) the quality reports are provided at doctor level; and iii) quality reports are
widely disseminated through websites, newspapers, and leaets. Our analysis suggests
that name and shame policies will have the intended e¤ect of raising quality.
We conclude by further characterising the three equilibria. The semi-separating equi-
librium smoothly connects the separating with the pooling equilibrium (Appendix 1),
which is illustrated in Figures 1 (qualities) and 2 (payo¤s). If reputational concerns are
intermediate, the bad doctor increases quality in expected terms when reputation concerns
are higher to avoid the increasingly important consequences of a bad reputation. In terms
of payo¤s, both the bad and the good doctors are worse o¤ under a pooling equilibrium
than either a separating or a semi-separating equilibrium.6 Figure 1 also shows that when
the proportion of good doctors  is high (which is consistent with some experimental ev-
idence on doctorsaltruism; Godager and Wiesen, 2013), then name and shame policies
are more likely to induce the bad doctor to increase quality driven by the higher expected
altruism (in doctor population) and reputational gains.
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
6When reputational concerns are low, the payo¤ of the good (bad) doctor increases (decreases) with
the intensity of reputational concerns. This is intuitive. Higher intensity amplies the positive (negative)
reputation payo¤ of being known as the good (bad) doctor. In contrast, when the intensity of reputation
concerns are intermediate, both doctors payo¤s reduce with the intensity of reputation concerns. As
the bad doctor increases quality (in expected terms), patients and society increasingly cannot distinguish
between the two types and therefore the reputational payo¤ vanishes. When reputational concerns are
high, patients and society cannot distinguish at all between good and bad doctors. The good doctor ends
up with the same payo¤ obtained in the absence of reputational concerns. The bad doctor obtains the
lowest payo¤, being induced to exert the higher quality and being able only to avoid a bad reputation,
instead of gaining a good one.
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3 Crowding in or crowding out?
In this section, we investigate whether an increase in pecuniary incentives crowds out the
e¤ect of the reputational concerns. In our model this occurs if a change in price, due
for example to the introduction of a pay-for-performance scheme, a¤ects the range of
reputational concerns over which the pooling equilibrium arises. In turn, this depends on
 ; ie the cost to the bad doctor of mimicking the good doctor.
Does an increase in price generate crowding out or crowding in? We obtain (Appendix
2):
@
@p
=  q
()  q()
   
revenue e¤ect
+Wq(q
())
@q()
@p
quality e¤ect
: (4)
The e¤ect is indeterminate. An increase in price a¤ects the revenues of the bad doctor
more when he provides high quality than when he provides low quality (rst term in (4)).
This e¤ect, which we call the revenue e¤ect, is negative and tends to induce crowding in.
However, a higher price also increases the qualities that maximise the non-reputational
payo¤s of the good doctor and the bad doctor, q() and q(). By the envelope theorem
we know that an increase in the lower quality q() has no e¤ect on the non-reputational
payo¤ of the bad doctor. An increase in the higher quality q() reduces it because
it brings the bad doctor even further away from his non-reputational optimum quality
(second term in (4)). This e¤ect, which we call the quality e¤ect, is positive and tends to
induce crowding out. Which of the two e¤ects dominates ultimately depends on whether
the good doctor proportionally provides higher or lower quality than the bad doctor, which
in turn depends on the sign of @2q()=@2 (Appendix 2).
Proposition 2 Crowding in (out) arises if the good doctor proportionally provides lower
(higher) quality than the bad doctor, ie if @2q()=@2 < 0 (> 0).
If the marginal benet is decreasing, then under some regularity conditions on costs,
the good doctor provides proportionally lower quality and therefore crowding in arises. A
su¢ cient condition is that Wqq < 0, Wqqq  0 and Cqqq  0 (Appendix 2). This condition
is satised if the cost of quality is, for instance, quadratic or linear. For crowding out to
arise, the marginal benet from quality has to be constant or mildly decreasing and the
marginal cost has to be concave in quality.
The key policy insight is that under a wide range of scenarios crowding out is unlikely
to arise. Therefore, policies that introduce a pay-for-performance scheme do not seem
to be in conict with the introduction of report cards. However, this conclusion is valid
when report cards and pay-for-performance schemes capture all dimensions of treatment
quality. This assumption is relaxed in the next section.
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4 Multitasking
In this section we extend the model to allow for multiple dimensions of quality, which
leads to the multitasking problem: incentivizing one dimension of quality may trigger
a reduction in the unincentivised dimension of quality (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991;
Eggleston, 2005; Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011). We assume that quality 1, q1, can be
observed by society, and quality 2, q2; cannot be observed either because the patient lacks
the expertise to evaluate it or because quality 2 is not reported. Both doctors have the
same costs, C(q1; q2), with Cq1 > 0; Cq2 > 0; Cq1q1 > 0 and Cq2q2 > 0. We assume qualities
are substitutes, Cq1q2 > 0 with Cq1q1Cq2q2 > C
2
q1q2 , and an increase quality 1 increases the
marginal cost of quality 2. Patients benet from both quality dimensions: W (q1; q2), with
Wq1 > 0; Wq2 > 0 andWq1q2 = 0: Doctors prots are  (q1; q2) = T+pq1 C(q1; q2), where
p is a unit price for observable quality 1. The non-reputational payo¤ is V =  + W .
Reputational concerns arise only as a result of changes in observable quality 1 generating
a payo¤ equal to (s (q1)   E ()). The non-reputational optimal qualities satisfy p +
Wq1(q

1) = Cq1(q

1; q

2); Wq2(q

2) = Cq2(q

1; q

2) : the marginal benet of quality due to
monetary and altruistic concerns equals the marginal cost. An increase in price incentivises
the observable quality but disincentivises unobservable quality, @q1=@p > 0; @q2=@p < 0.
Qualities increase in altruism, @q1=@ > 0; @q2=@ > 0; if the degree of cost substitution
is not too high (all proofs in Appendix 3).
Pooling equilibrium. The good doctor chooses qualities which maximise the non-
reputational payo¤: qE1
 


= q1
 


; qE2
 


= q2
 


, and the bad doctor chooses the
same observable quality 1 as the good doctor: qE1 () = q

1(). But since qualities are
substitutes, the bad doctor compensates by providing a low unobservable quality, qM2 ()
satisfying Wq2
 
qM2

= Cq2(q

1(); q
M
2 ), which is lower than under a separating equilib-
rium, qE2 () = q
M
2 () < q

2(). The bad doctor has an incentive to mimic the good doctor
when reputation concerns are high:
  1

def
=
1

V (q1(); q2() j )  V (q1(); qM2 () j )
    : (5)
Separating equilibrium. Each doctor chooses qualities qE1 () = q

1 () and q
E
2 () =
q2 () that maximise non-reputational payo¤s. The good doctor never has an incentive
to mimic the bad doctor. The bad doctor has no incentive to mimic the good doctor if
reputational gains are low: 0    1.
We summarise with the following proposition.7
7 In line with Section 2, a semi-separating equilibrium arises for intermediate reputational concerns,
i.e. 1    1=, where the good doctor always provides high qualities in both dimensions, and the
bad doctor randomises between the qualities provided under the separating and the pooling equilibrium.
Higher reputational concerns increase the probability that the bad doctor provides the high observable
12
Proposition 3 If reputational concerns are small (for 0    1), a separating equilib-
rium arises where both types of doctor chose qualities which maximise the non-reputational
payo¤. If reputational concerns are high (for   1=), a pooling equilibrium arises where
the good doctor chooses qualities which maximise the non-reputational payo¤. Driven by
reputational concerns, the bad doctor chooses the same observable quality chosen by the
good doctor but compensates by providing a low level of the unobservable quality (which is
lower than the unobservable quality maximising the non-reputational payo¤ ).
We conclude by highlighting di¤erences with the existing literature on multitasking and
key policy implications. The presence of multitasking changes the nature of the pooling
equilibrium, which is at the core of this study. It increases the scope for the pooling
equilibrium to arise and for policies which publish quality indicators to induce a change
in doctorsbehaviour. The presence of multitasking makes it easier for the bad doctor
to mimic the good doctor, since the additional cost of increasing the observable quality
can be o¤set by reducing the unobservable quality. In terms of policy, it is precisely
this o¤setting behaviour which makes publishing information less desirable. There may
be scenarios in which the patientsbenet from unobservable quality is more important
than the benet from observable quality, so that publishing information may be harmful
to patients. Formally, the comparison depends on W (q1
 


; qM2 ()) ? W (q1 () ; q2 ()):
Although this result is in line with the multitasking literature, from a policy perspective
it is important to highlight that name and shame policies are not exempt from this issue
and can be undesirable as a result. Moreover, the introduction of a pay-for-performance
scheme may exacerbate the multitasking problem when reputational concerns are high. An
increase in price will increase observable quality and it will further reduce unobservable
quality. Although this also arises for low reputation concerns, unobservable quality is
always lower under a pooling equilibrium than under a separating equilibrium. Therefore,
under the assumption of decreasing marginal benet of the unobservable quality, it is
likely that the patient will su¤er more from a reduction in unobservable quality when
reputational concerns are high.
Our results are consistent with some empirical evidence. Lu (2012) nds that after the
introduction of the Nursing Home Quality Initiative in the US scores of quality measures
improve for the reported dimensions but deteriorate for the unreported ones. Our model
also predicts that name and shame policies will reduce the variance in observable quality
and increase the variance in unobservable quality. This is also in line with the empirical
evidence. Werner et al. (2009) analyse the e¤ects of public reporting in nursing facilities
and nd that, after the publication of some measures of quality, [f]or unreported measures
that worsened on average, the decrement in quality was generally larger among low-scoring
quality and the low unobservable quality.
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facilities than high-scoring facilities(p.390), whereas all the three reported measures of
quality improved after the reporting policy was implemented(p.388).
5 Optimal contracting
In this section we relax the assumption that the doctors contract is exogenous, and allow
the purchaser of health services (eg a public or private insurer) to design the optimal
contract by endogenising the choice of the pay-for-performance price p and of the xed
transfer T . We derive the optimal contract under the assumption that the purchaser is
constrained to the use of the linear contract T + pq which is independent of the doctors
type: both the good and the bad doctor receive the same xed budget and the same price
per unit of quality provided. Doctors can, however, di¤er in the quality provided. Such
contracts are common in the health sector (Rosenthal et al., 2005; and Section 2). We
solve by backward induction. We start by deriving the optimal price under a pooling
equilibrium, and then verify ex-post the range of reputational concerns over which pooling
arises when evaluated at such optimal price. We proceed similarly for the separating
equilibrium.
Pooling equilibrium. With high reputational concerns both doctors provide the same
high quality q
 
; p

for a given price. We assume that the purchaser maximises the
di¤erence between patients benet and the transfer to the provider:
Max
T;p
W
 
q
 
; p
  T   pq  ; p ; (6)
subject to two types of constraint: the participation constraints ensure that each doctor
is willing to provide services no matter what his type, and the limited-liability constraints
ensure that each doctor does not make a negative prot. The participation constraint is
always satised when the limited-liability constraint is satised, since the utility is the sum
of the prots and the altruistic component. Therefore, the limited-liability constraint is
the only binding one (Appendix 4), which substituted into (6) gives the optimal contract:
pP =
 
1  Wq (qo) ; TP = C(qo)  pP qo; (7)
where quality qo is such that it equates the marginal benet with the marginal cost of
quality, Wq (qo) = Cq (qo). A higher level of altruism for the good doctor implies that the
purchaser can set a lower price to induce the desired level of quality. The xed transfer
covers the di¤erences between the costs and the revenues from the pay-for-performance
scheme to ensure that the doctor breaks even. The key insight is that under a pooling
equilibrium, the purchaser can obtain allocative e¢ ciency by designing a contract that is
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aimed at the good doctor. Since the bad doctor mimics the good doctor, the same contract
also induces allocative e¢ ciency for the bad doctor. This pooling equilibrium arises for
  (pP )=.
Separating equilibrium. With low reputational concerns, the purchaser problem is:
Max
T;p


W
 
q
 
; p
  T   pq  ; p+ (1  ) [W (q (; p))  T   pq (; p)] (8)
subject to the participation constraints and the limited-liability constraints. Since prot
decreases in altruism, it is the liability-constraint of the good doctor that is binding, so
that T = C(q
 
; p

)   pq  ; p. The participation constraint of the good and the bad
doctor is never binding (Appendix 4). Substituting for T in (8) and maximising with
respect to price, we obtain
Wq
 
q
 
; p
 @q(; p)
@p
+ (1  )Wq (q (; p)) @q
 (; p)
@p
(9)
= Cq(q
  ; p)@q(; p)
@p
  (1  )

q
 
; p
  q (; p) + p@q(; p)
@p
  @q
 (; p)
@p

:
The optimal price is set such that the average marginal benet (weighted by the response
of quality to price) is equal to the marginal cost. The marginal cost has two components:
since the limited-liability constraint is binding for the good doctor, the rst term refers to
the marginal cost of the good doctor (weighted by his responsiveness of quality to price).
The second term accounts for rent extraction distortions: since the bad doctor makes a
positive prot, it is optimal to distort prices to reduce such rents. The rent extraction term
pushes the price upwards if doctors do not di¤er signicantly in their quality responsiveness
to price. The optimal contract is given by the pair

pS ; TS
	
where pS denotes the optimal
price under the separating equilibrium in (9) and TS = C(q
 
; pS

)  pSq  ; pS is the
optimal lump-sum transfer to ensure the doctors break even. The separating equilibrium
arises for   (pS).
The key policy insight is that when the purchaser is constrained to the use of the
linear contract, T + pq, the purchaser is better o¤ under a pooling equilibrium than under
a separating equilibrium. This is because reputational concerns reduce (eliminate) di¤er-
ences in qualities between di¤erent doctor types. In turn, the purchaser can implement
allocative e¢ ciency for both types by setting a price which is targeted at the good doctor.
The bad doctor simply mimics the good doctor. Neither type makes a prot. In contrast,
the purchaser is constrained under a separating equilibrium. Since di¤erent types provide
di¤erent qualities for a given price, the purchaser aims at inducing allocative e¢ ciency
for the average type. Moreover, it distorts price to reduce informational rents for the bad
doctor. If di¤erences in responsiveness of quality to price between the good and the bad
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doctor are small, then the optimal price is higher under a separating equilibrium than
under a pooling equilibrium. This arises for two main reasons: rst, since the average
type is less motivated than the good type, the purchaser needs to incentivise more doctors
through a higher-powered incentive scheme; second, a higher price helps to reduce the
informational rent of the bad doctor. The purchaser is also better o¤ under a pooling
equilibrium than under a semi-separating one, (pS)    (pP )= (Appendix 4), and
the optimal price under a semi-separating equilibrium is between the price under pooling
and under separating.
We summarise in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the purchaser is constrained to the use of the linear contract fT; pg
which is independent of doctors type, high reputational concerns induce a pooling equilib-
rium where both doctors provide the same quality and make the purchaser better o¤.
Name and shame policies and pay-for-performance schemes tend to be substitutes.
Policymakers can induce doctors to provide higher quality either by publishing and dis-
seminating performance indicators or by tying the performance indicators to nancial in-
centives. This section has shown that if the purchaser is constrained to a linear contract,
the purchaser may do better by widely disseminating information than by strengthening
pay-for-performance schemes. However, the result critically relies on the assumption that
policy makers are constrained to linear contracts. It can be shown that if the purchaser can
implement more exible non-linear contracts, then the purchaser can obtain the same wel-
fare under a name and shame policy or a more sophisticated pay-for-performance scheme.
More precisely, if the purchaser can implement a menu of contracts o¤ering a di¤erent
transfer in combination with a di¤erent price level: fT () ; p ()g with  = ; , then al-
locative e¢ ciency can be obtained for both doctors also under a separating equilibrium
(proof available from the authors, and in line with Chone and Ma, 2011). Although these
contracts are more exible, we are not aware of policy examples which take such a form.
6 Equilibrium selection and the intuitive criterion test
In this section, we discuss two issues regarding the equilibria investigated in this paper.
First, we discuss whether the beliefs that sustain the pooling equilibrium pass the Intuitive
Criterion test (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Second, we address
whether other Perfect Bayesian Equilibria coexist with the pooling equilibrium.
Pooling and the intuitive criterion. The pooling equilibrium (qE () = q
 


for all
) is sustained by assuming that observing any quality above the one chosen by the good
doctor q
 


leads to the same beliefs (namely, s = E ()) as observing the quality of the
good doctor. Such (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs fail the Intuitive Criterion Test (ICT) if
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there exists a quality qh > q
 


such that (i) the good doctor prefers quality qh to q
 


if
the former brings the best possible beliefs about altruism; and (ii) the bad doctor prefers
his non-reputational optimum q () to qh even if the latter leads to the best possible
beliefs. If (i) and (ii) are satised at quality qh then the Intuitive Criterion demands that
society put zero probability on the doctor being bad upon observing such quality. This
would contradict our assumption on the beliefs assigned to quality levels above the good
doctors quality. It turns out that a quality qh satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) does exist
for all reputation concerns  > = if the patients benet monotonically increases in
quality so that the single-crossing condition Vq  Wq (q) > 0 is satised for all q. In
contrast, if the marginal benet from quality is negative for high intensity of care this is
not necessarily so. We summarize our results in the next proposition (proofs in Appendix
5).
Proposition 5 Suppose that the benet function is quadratic, W (q) = v1q  v2q2, so that
the marginal benet from quality (intensity of care) can be negative, and cost is linear,
C(q) = cq, where v1; v2; c are positive parameters, and that the purchaser sets price to
achieve allocative e¢ ciency, pP = c
 
1  . Then there exists a threshold for reputational
concerns  >  def= 
 
c2
v2
1
1  ; such that the pooling equilibrium passes the Intuitive
Criterion Test.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3 (drawn, without loss of generality, for  = 14 ,
 = 34 , c = 1, v1 = 5 and v2 =
1
8). The horizontal line represents the threshold of
reputational concerns  below which the separating equilibrium arises,  . The hyperbola
represents the threshold of reputational concerns above which the pooling equilibrium
arises, =. For reputational concerns between the hyperbola and the lower horizontal
line the semiseparating equilibrium arises. The increasing curve depicts the threshold for
reputational concerns  such that the pooling equilibrium passes the intuitive criterion
test. The threshold  decreases in the good doctors altruism and increases in the bad
doctors altruism. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium is intuitive if the good doctor has
high altruism and if the bad doctor has low altruism. If the good doctor has high altruism,
he is very sensitive to reductions in patients benets, which will occur if his care is
excessive. If society observes such an intense treatment then it becomes implausible that
it comes from a good doctor, and there does not exist any intensity of treatment such
that only good doctors would choose. Similarly, if the bad doctor has low altruism, he
tends to ignore the fact that patientsmarginal benets are negative when excessive care
is provided. This implies that if society observes such excessive care then it becomes more
plausible that it comes from a bad doctor.
[Figure 3 here]
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Other equilibria and the Riley Outcome. As it is usually the case for signalling games,
many PBEs coexist in large regions of parameter values. We have restricted attention
to equilibria where (i) at least the good doctor sets his non-reputational optima and (ii)
monotonicity and pessimism are imposed on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We derive another
PBE candidate that the literature has often focused on: the so-called Riley Outcome
(Riley, 1979). In this (separating) outcome, the good doctor sets some (large) quality ~q
and the bad doctor sets his non-reputational optimum quality q (). The aforementioned
quality ~q is such that the bad doctor is indi¤erent between ~q and his non-reputational
optimum q (). It is also well known that if the single-crossing condition holds (W (q) is
monotone), then the Riley Outcome is a PBE, and moreover is the only such equilibrium
that passes the ICT. In contrast, we show that under the assumptions listed in the previous
proposition, the Riley Outcome ceases to be a PBE. We summarize the results in the next
proposition.
Proposition 6 If the marginal benet from quality (intensity of care) can be negative,
the Riley Outcome is not a PBE under the same assumptions as in Proposition 5 when
reputational concerns are high,  > RO
def
=

 
c2
v2

1
2
q

 +
+
4

.
When reputational concerns are high, the bad doctor has an incentive to mimic the
good doctor even when this requires high intensity of treatment. This is reinforced by
the fact that the bad doctor is relatively insensitive to a decrease in patients benet
due to excessive treatment. Therefore, the minimal intensity of treatment (~q) that avoids
imitation is far from (and above of) the good doctors non-reputational optimum, where
marginal benets are already negative. For high reputational concerns (ie  > RO),
intensity of treatment ~q entails such a low benet for the patient that the good doctor
prefers his non-reputational optimum, where patientsbenet is higher, even if this brings
a reputational loss. Hence the good doctor deviates from his Riley-Outcome strategy.
Figure 4 illustrates (drawn for the same parameter values as Figure 3). This gure includes
the (upper) horizontal line representing the threshold such that, for reputational concerns
 > RO; the Riley Outcome is not a PBE. The most favorable region for supporting the
pooling equilibrium is the one above line RO and enclosed between curves = and .
Indeed, in this region only the pooling equilibrium is a PBE and moreover it passes the
ICT. This region requires su¢ ciently high reputational concerns and intermediate values
on the proportion of good doctors.
[Figure 4 here]
18
7 Extensions
7.1 Risk averse doctors
In this section, we expand the analysis to allow doctors to be risk averse. A doctors
non-reputational payo¤ is in this case given by eV (q) = u (T + pq) + W (q)  C (q) ; with
u0 > 0 and u00  0, which is still concave in quality and increasing in altruism. The rst
order condition for quality q () becomes pu0 (T + pq)+ Wq (q) = Cq (q). The thresholds
for the three equilibrium regimes,  and =, are given by the expressions in Section 2.
The only di¤erence is that V (q) is replaced with eV (q) so that  = eV (q() j )  eV (q   j
))=
 
   . Our key results are therefore qualitatively similar under risk aversion. In
Section 3, we have shown that the e¤ect of an increase in price p per unit of quality is
generally ambiguous under risk neutrality. This is still the case under risk aversion, but
we can show that if the xed payment T is relatively small, then crowding in is reinforced
if the index of relative risk aversion is less than one and the index of absolute risk aversion
is increasing (u000  0). There is neither crowding in nor crowding out under constant
relative risk aversion (eg if the utility function is logarithmic in consumption). (Proofs
available from the authors and omitted for brevity.)
7.2 Overprovision of quality
The main model assumes that quality is under-provided and that a pooling equilibrium
is always an improvement since it induces the bad doctor to provide higher quality. In
this section, we discuss how the model can be adapted to the case of over-provision of
quality. Suppose that doctors are reimbursed a proportion of the cost ,8 and their prot
function is e (q) = T + pq   (1   )C(q). The optimal quality q () ; which maximises
the non-reputational payo¤, satises p+ Wq = (1  )Cq: In line with Section 5, suppose
that the rst-best quality for the purchaser qo is such that it induces allocative e¢ ciency,
Wq (q
o) = Cq (q
o). Then, in the absence of reputational concerns, it is straightforward to
show that if altruism is less than one, over-provision of quality of the doctor with high
altruism arises for su¢ ciently high degree of cost reimbursement, q
 


> qo (this could
also hold for the doctor with low altruism, for very high levels of cost reimbursement, which
we rule out). The key insights of the main model still hold: the thresholds for the three
equilibrium regimes,  and =, are given by the same expressions as in Section 2. The
only di¤erence is that (q) is replaced with e(q). When reputational concerns are high,
the doctor with low altruism mimics the doctor with high altruism and provides a higher
quality, which is above the rst-best level. In other words, name and shame policies now
8Such a reimbursement system falls in the broad category of supply-side cost sharing. For instance,
most Health Maintenance Organizations in the US compensate their doctors through a at salary plus a
variable payment based on the volume of services they provide (Ellis and McGuire, 1993).
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induce over-provision of quality for both doctors. Instead, when reputational concerns are
low, eg in the absence of name and shame policies, the doctor with low altruism under-
provides quality and the doctor with high altruism over-provides quality. The welfare
implications are ambiguous. Name and shame policies can reduce welfare if the welfare
loss from over-provision of quality of the doctor with low altruism under pooling is higher
than the welfare loss of under-provision of quality from the doctor with low altruism in the
separating equilibrium. The same would hold under a multitasking set-up as in Section 4
so that over-provision of observed quality can co-exist with under-provision of unobserved
quality.
7.3 Reputational concerns and doctorscompetition
The main model assumes that reputational concerns for doctors are non-monetary and
are determined by what other people (their family, the community, their peers, other
patients, and more broadly society) think about them. An alternative interpretation is
that reputational concerns arise from future monetary payo¤s if, for example, a better
reputation brings future patient demand. This would require a dynamic set-up, in which
doctors care about their reputation in Period 1 due to non-monetary motives but also
because they compete for demand in Period 2. Within a model a la Hotelling,9 we can
show that the pooling, separating and semi-separating equilibrium obtained in Section 2
also arise as a function of the sum of the non-monetary (as in Section 2) and the monetary
reputational concerns from future demand (proof omitted but available from the authors).
8 Conclusions
The health sector has witnessed a proliferation of performance indicators in the public
domain. Can the mere publishing of information on the quality of doctors induce them
to change behaviour and work harder? The analysis of this study suggests Yes, it can.
Policies colloquially known as name and shame, in which poorly performing doctors are
subjected to shame in front of the community, can induce the poor performing doctors to
provide more e¤ort to avoid being tagged as bad doctors, a form of virtuous imitation.
9Suppose that in period 1 there is a continuum of patients uniformly distributed on a unit line, with two
doctors, A and B, located in the extremes of the unit line. Patients are uninformed about whether doctors
are good or bad and therefore visit the nearest doctor. Hence each doctor treats half of the market in
period 1, and the share of the market in period 1 does not convey any information about doctors altruism.
Patients are homogeneous in benets and treatment costs, and these are given by W (q) and C(q) as in
Section 2. Each doctor i = A;B chooses quality qi to treat her patients in period 1. Once these patients
are treated, they are cured and disappear from the market. In period 2, a new set of patients appears.
These patients are again uniformly distributed on the unit line. The net revenue for each patient treated
is m  0 which is borne by a third party payer. Patients in period 2 choose doctors based on the posterior
beliefs about doctorsaltruism. These patients care about these beliefs because their benet from visiting
a doctor increases with this doctors altruism.
20
Moreover, we have shown that pay-for-performance schemes are not a perfect substitute
for policies which disseminate information. Publishing indicators can raise quality even if
incentive schemes are optimally set by purchasers, as long as the purchaser is constrained
to adopt relatively simple contracts (ie in the absence of menus of contracts, which are
rarely observed). Our results are good news also in terms of equity. The presence of
su¢ ciently strong reputational concerns always reduces the gap between the quality of the
good and the bad doctor.
Our model assumes that doctors have perfect information on the benets and costs of
quality. It may be argued that for some treatments they may have imperfect information
about the appropriate quality. Under such scenarios doctors may respond to quality
reports if they convey information about the appropriate care. We leave this issue for
future research.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. The model. Our equilibrium concept to solve the model is the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium: An equilibrium is a pair of functions of qualities qE() :

; 
	 !
R+ and beliefs S(q) : R+ ! [0; 1] such that (i) for every  in

; 
	
, qE() maximizes
(q)+W (q)+(s (q) E ()) with S(q) = S(q)+ 1  S(q) , (ii) S(q) is computed
using Bayesrule whenever possible, and (iii) S(q) is any number between 0 and 1 when
Bayesrule cannot be applied. Bayesrule cannot be applied when the observed quality q
is neither typesposited equilibrium choice (ie the denominator of Bayesformula is zero).
As an example of an out of equilibrium action, suppose that in (a pooling) equilibrium all
types set q = q0, then any q 6= q0 is a non-equilibrium action.
Separating equilibrium. Out of equilibrium beliefs should satisfy monotonicity and
pessimism, so S (q) = 0 (so s (q) = ) for any q < q () and S (q) = 1 (so s (q) = )
for any q  q (). For these strategies and beliefs to constitute a separating PBE, we
need the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints for both types to be satised. The good
doctor has no incentive to deviate to any other quality if
V (q() j ) + (   E ()) 
(
V (q j )  (E ()  ) for all q < q   ;
V (q j ) + (   E ()) for all q  q  
)
;
and the bad doctor has no incentive to deviate to any other quality if
V (q() j )  (E ()  ) 
(
V (q j )  (E ()  ) if q < q   ;
V (q j ) + (   E ()) if q  q  
)
:
The IC constraint for the good doctor is always satised since the high quality q
 


maximizes the non-reputational payo¤ V (q j ), and choosing this quality instead of any
other quality also maximises the reputational payo¤. As for the bad doctor, since the
low quality q() maximizes the non-reputational payo¤ V (q j ), choosing such quality
generates the same reputation loss as any other quality which is below the high qual-
ity q
 


. The bad doctor must also be better-o¤ by providing the low quality q()
rather than by disguising himself by providing the higher quality q
 


in the attempt of
gaining the reputational payo¤. Note that the bad doctor has no incentive to choose a
quality which is strictly above the high quality q
 


since it would increase costs with
no additional gains (ie V (q
 

 j ) +       is maximized at q = q   conditional
on q  q  ). Hence the lower expression in the RHS of the bad doctors IC implies
V (q() j )  (E ()  )  V (q   j ) + (   E ()).
Pooling equilibrium. According to our beliefs restrictions, we have that any q < q()
indicates that the doctor is bad, ie S (q) = 0 (so s (q) = ) for any q < q
 


;
and that any higher quality than q
 


does not provide any further information, ie
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S (q) =  (so s (q) = E ()) for q  q  . For these strategies and beliefs to con-
stitute an equilibrium, we need again the incentive-compatibility constraints to be sat-
ised, that is, both types of doctor must have an incentive to provide the high quality,
namely, V (q() j ) 
(
V (q j ) for all q  q   ;
V (q j )  (E ()  ) for all q < q  
)
and V (q() j ) (
V (q j ) for all q  q   ;
V (q j )  (E ()  ) for all q < q  
)
. The good doctors IC is always satised
since (i) the non-reputational payo¤ V (q j ) is maximized at the high quality q() and,
(ii) any other quality below q() brings a reputational loss (equal to  (E ()  )). The
bad doctors IC is satised only if reputational concerns are su¢ ciently high. To see this,
consider rst the upper condition in his IC. Since the non-reputational payo¤ V (q j ) is
maximized at the low quality q () < q
 


, it decreases for any q in excess of q
 


.
Therefore, the condition reduces to V (q() j )  V (q () j )  (E ()  ), which can
be re-written as   =:
The semi-separating equilibrium. Assume  2   ; . Suppose that the good doc-
tor chooses the high quality qE
 


= q
 


with certainty, and the bad doctor chooses
the low quality with probability r and the high quality with probability (1   r). Then
the equilibrium is characterised by r = rE def= 1   (1 )
 
 


< 1; S (q ()) = 0 ,
S
 
q
 


=  > , 
s (q ()) = , and S (q ()) =  + 
 
    > E (). Given
the posited strategies, BayesRule can always be applied to q 2 fq   ; q ()g. Pos-
terior beliefs when either of these two qualities is observed are S (q ()) = 0 and
S
 
q
 


= 1 r(1 ) > . These beliefs yield the following expected types: 
S (q ()) =
 and S
 
q
 


= 
+(1 r)(1 )
1 r(1 ) . Any quality q 62 fq
 


; q ()g is out of equilib-
rium. According to our restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we have that S (q) =(
0 for all q < q
 


;

1 r(1 ) for all q  q
 

 ). Hence the expected type upon observation of such q is
S (q) =
(
 for all q < q
 


,

1 r(1 ) +
(1 )(1 r)
1 r(1 )  for all q  q
 

 ). We can now determine the rep-
utational payo¤: G (q) =
(   (E ()  ) if q < q   ;


+(1 r)(1 )
1 r(1 )   E ()

if q  q  
)
. For these strate-
gies and beliefs to constitute a PBE we need three conditions. First, the bad doctor
has to be indi¤erent between q = q
 


and q = q (); second, the bad doctor has
to (weakly) prefer any of the latter to setting q 62 fq   ; q ()g; and third, the good
doctor has to weakly prefer q = q
 


to q 6= q   despite the fact that a high qual-
ity does not fully reveal his type. Using the fact that q () maximizes V (qj), and that
+(1 r)(1 )
1 r(1 )    = 
 
1 r(1 ) , these three conditions can be written as
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V (q() j ) + 
   
1  r (1  ) = V (q
 () j ); (10)
V (q () j ) 
(
V (q j ) for all q < q  
V (q j ) + 


 
1 r(1 )

for q > q
 


;
(11)
V (q() j ) 
(
V (q j )    1 r(1 ) for all q < q
 


V (q j ) for all q  q   : (12)
Notice that the upper expression in (11) is always satised because q() maximises V (q j
). The lower expression in (11) can be rewritten, using (10), as V (q() j )  V (q j ) for
q > q
 


. This condition is again satised since q() maximises V (q j ). Similarly, (12)
is also always satised since V (q j ) is largest at q() and since   1 r(1 ) > 0 because
; r 2 (0; 1). Hence only (10) is restrictive and equivalent to r = 1   (1 )
 
 


= rE .
Substituting this expression into the expression for S
 
q
 


, we obtain (after some
algebra) S
 
q
 


=  . Then 
S (q ()) =  + 
 
   .
Equilibrium payo¤s. Let us use S (q ()) =  + 
 
   . To sustain a mixed
strategy with support fq   ; q ()g, the bad doctor must be indi¤erent between these
two qualities. Hence his payo¤ is given by V (q () j )   (E ()   ) = V (q   j
) + (   )     . The good doctor obtains V (q() j ) +  S  q    E () =
V (q() j ) + (   )     . Notice that the good doctors payo¤ tends to V (q() j
)+ (1  )      when  tends to  , which is the same as the separating payo¤at  =  ,
and that it tends to V (q() j ) when  tends to =, which is the same as the pooling
payo¤. This is an interesting feature of the semi-separating equilibrium: it connects the
separating and the pooling equilibrium. This can be easily checked by inspection.
Appendix 2. Crowding in and crowding out. Using the envelop theorem, we
have that: @V (q
()j )
@p = q
() > 0: a higher price increases revenues and therefore the
utility of the bad doctor when the optimal quality q() is chosen. In contrast
@V (q(); )
@p
= q() + [p+ Wq(q())  Cq(q())]@q
()
@p
? 0: (13)
Higher prices increase revenues but also increase the quality of the good doctor, which
makes it more costly for the bad doctor to disguise as the good doctor. By substitu-
tion, we therefore obtain @@p =
q() q()
   
p Cq(q())+Wq(q())
 
@q()
@p : From the FOC
of quality of the good doctor we have p   Cq(q()) =  Wq(q()) which we substi-
tute in @@p : The result is obtained:
@
@p =   q
() q()
  + Wq(q
())@q
()
@p . Notice that
@q()
@
=
Wq(q())
 Wqq(q())+Cqq(q()) =Wq(q
())@q
()
@p . By substitution we obtain
@
@p =
@q()
@
 
q() q()
  . The e¤ect of prices on  then depends on the concavity or convexity of quality
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as a function of altruism q(). If the function is concave (convex), ie @
2q()
@2
< (>)0, then
@q()
@
< (>) q
() q()
  . Therefore
@
@p has the same sign as
@2q()
@2
=Wq
2Wqq + (Wqqq   Cqqq) (@q()=@)
( Wqq + Cqq)2
:
A su¢ cient condition for crowding in is Wqq < 0, Wqqq  0 and Cqqq  0 (the latter is
always satised if the cost is quadratic or linear since Cqqq = 0). For crowding out to
arise, the marginal benet from quality has to be constant or mildly decreasing and the
marginal cost has to be concave in quality (for instance if C(q) = qn for 1 < n < 2).
Appendix 3. Multitasking. The problem is well behaved, and the SOCs are:
Vq1q1(q

1; q

2) = Wq1q1(q

1) Cq1q1(q1; q2) < 0, Vq2q2(q1; q2) = Wq2q2(q2) Cq2q2(q1; q2) < 0
and Vq1q1Vq2q2  C2q1q2 > 0. The e¤ect of price on qualities is:
@q1
@p =  
Vq2q2
Vq1q1Vq2q2 C2q1q2
> 0,
@q2
@p =  
Cq1q2
Vq1q1Vq2q2 C2q1q2
< 0: The e¤ect of altruism on quality is: @q

1
@ =  
Wq1Vq2q2+Wq2Cq1q2
Vq1q1Vq2q2 C2q1q2
;
@q2
@ =  
Wq2Vq1q1+Wq1Cq1q2
Vq1q1Vq2q2 C2q1q2
: An equilibrium is a pair of functions of qualities qE1 (); q
E
2 () :
; 
	 ! R+ and beliefs S(q1) : R+ ! [0; 1] such that: (i) for every  in ; 	,
qE1 (); q
E
2 ()maximises (q1; q2)+W (q1; q2)+G(q1) once 
S(q1) = 
S(q1)+
 
1  S(q1)


has been substituted into G(q1), (ii) S(q1) is computed using Bayesrule whenever pos-
sible, and (iii) S(q1) is any number between 0 and 1 when Bayesrule cannot be applied.
Pooling equilibrium. Since doctors provide the same quality qE1 (), patients and society
cannot distinguish between good and bad doctors. There is therefore no updating in beliefs
after observing the high quality q1
 


. Hence S
 
q1
 


=  and the expected type
conditional on patients observing the high quality is the average type, s
 
q1
 


= E ().
Moreover, according to our beliefs restrictions (again monotonicity and pessimism) we
have that any smaller quality than q1() implies that the doctor is bad, ie 
S (q1) = 0
(so s (q1) = ) for any q1 < q1
 


; and that any higher quality than q1
 


does not
provide any further information, ie S (q1) =  (so s (q1) = E ()) for q1  q1
 


.
For the posited strategies and beliefs to constitute a pooling equilibrium, we need the
incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints to be satised, so that both types of doctor have
an incentive to provide the high quality. The good doctor has no incentive deviate if
V (q1(); q

2() j ) 
(
V (q1; q2 j ) for all q1  q1
 


V (q1; q2 j )  (E ()  ) for all q1 < q1
 


.
(14)
The bad doctor has no incentive to deviate if
V (q1(); q
M
2 () j ) 
(
V (q1; q2 j ) for all q1  q1
 


V (q1; q2 j )  (E ()  ) for all q1 < q1
 


.
(15)
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The IC constraint for the good doctor is always satised since (i) the non-reputational
payo¤ V (q1; q2 j ) is maximized at the high qualities q1() and q2() and, (ii) any other
quality below q1() brings a reputational loss (equal to   (E ()  )). The IC constraint
for the bad doctor is satised only if reputational concerns are su¢ ciently high. Since the
non-reputational payo¤ V (q1; q2 j ) is maximized at the low qualities q1() and q2(), it
decreases for any q1 in excess of q1
 


. Therefore, the condition reduces to
V (q1(); q
M
2 () j )  V (q1(); q2() j )  (E ()  ); (16)
which can be re-written as   1
def
=
V (q1();q

2()j) V (q1();qM2 ()j)
:( ) :
Separating equilibrium. Beliefs in the equilibrium path are such that observing a high
(low) quality signals with certainty high (low) altruism: S
 
q1
 


= 1 and S (q1 ()) =
0, where recall that only q1 is observable. Out of equilibrium beliefs should satisfy
monotonicity and pessimism, so S (q1) = 0 (so s (q1) = ) for any q < q1 () and
S (q1) = 1 (so s (q1) = ) for any q1  q1 (). For the posited strategies and beliefs to
constitute a separating Bayesian Equilibrium, we need again the IC constraints for both
types to be satised. The good doctor has no incentive to mimic the bad doctor:
V (q1(); q

2() j ) + (   E ()) 
(
V (q1; q2 j )  (E ()  ) for all q1 < q1
 


V (q1; q2 j ) + (   E ()) for all q1  q1
 


;
(17)
and the bad doctor has no incentive to mimic the good doctor:
V (q1(); q

2() j )  (E ()  ) 
(
V (q1; q

2 () j )  (E ()  ) if q1 < q1
 


V (q1; q
M
2 () j ) + (   E ()) if q1  q1
 


:
(18)
The latter can be re-written as: 0    1.
Semi-separating equilibrium. Given the posited strategies, BayesRule can always be
applied to q1 2 fq1
 


; q1 ()g. Indeed, posterior beliefs when either of these two qualities
is observed are S (q1 ()) = 0 and 
S
 
q1
 


= 1 r(1 ) . These beliefs yield the following
expected types: S (q1 ()) = ; 
S
 
q1
 


= 
+(1 r)(1 )
1 r(1 ) : Following similar steps as for
the main model we obtain:
rE = 1  
(1  )

  1
1

; S
 
q1
 


=
1

: (19)
Then S (q1 ()) = +
1

 
    : The payo¤ when choosing q (), which reveals that the
type is low, is given by V (q () j )   (E ()   ): The high types payo¤ is V (q() j
) + (   )     . To summarise, the good doctor always provides high qualities
q1
 


and q2
 


. The bad doctor provides qualities

q1
 


; qM2 ()
	
with probability
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rE = 1   (1 )

 1
1

, and fq1 () ; q2 ()g with probability (rE). The semi-separating
equilibrium smoothly connects the separating with the pooling equilibrium.
Appendix 4. Optimal contracting. Pooling equilibrium. Formally, the participa-
tion constraints (PCs) are V (q(; p); p; T j )  0 for the good doctor and V (q(; p); p; T j
)  0 for the bad doctor. The limited liability (L) constraint is the same for both types:
T + pq
 
; p
   C(q  ; p)  0. This follows naturally from the assumption that both
types have the same contract, the same cost function and provide the same quality under
a pooling equilibrium. When the limited liability constraint is binding the payo¤s are:
V (q(; p); p; T j ) = W (q(; p)) and V (q(; p); p; T j ) = W (q(; p)). Substituting
for T = C(q
 
; p

) pq  ; p into (6), and maximising with respect to the optimal price,
we obtain: 
Wq
 
q
 
; p
  Cq  q  ; p @q  ; p
@p
= 0: (20)
The condition suggests that the price should be designed to induce equality between the
marginal benet and marginal cost of quality. HenceWq
 
q
 
; p

= Cq
 
q
 
; p

, which
is satised for a unique value for q
 
; p

, which we refer to as qo.
Separating equilibrium. The participation constraints are: V (q(; p); p; T j ) +
(   E ())  0 for the good doctor and V (q(; p); p; T j )   (E ()   )  0 for
the bad doctor; and the limited-liability constraints are: T + pq
 
; p
  C(q  ; p)
and T + pq (; p)  C(q (; p)). Recall that () = T + pq (; p)   C(q (; p)) with
@
@ = [p  Cq(q (; p))] @q
(;p)
@ =  Bq(q (; p))@q
(;p)
@ < 0. The result is analogous to
Choné and Ma (2011). The PC of the good and the bad doctor is never binding. This is
clearly the case for the good doctor who obtains a positive reputational payo¤ and zero
prots. It is also the case for the bad doctor: the sum of the positive prot and the altruis-
tic component are higher than the negative reputational payo¤. If we evaluate the latter at
its lowest value, ie at  =  , we obtain: V (q() j )  [V (q
()j) V (q()j))]
  (E ()  ) =
V (q() j )  E()
  + V (q
   j ))E() 
  > 0.
Semi-separating equilibrium. Under a semi-separating equilibrium, (pS)   
(pP )= we have that the good doctor always provides the higher quality qE
 
; p

=
q
 
; p

. Instead, the bad doctor provides the low quality q (; p) with probability
rE = 1   (1 )

 (p)
(p)

and the high quality q
 
; p

with probability (1   rE). The
PCs are V (q() j ) + (   )      and V (q   j ) + (   )      : The L con-
straints are T + pq
 
; p
  C(q  ; p) and T + pq (; p)  C(q (; p)). Again, the PC
constraints are never binding. The problem becomes
Max
T;p
 
+ (1  )(1  rE) W  q  ; p  T   pq  ; p (21)
+(1  )rE [W (q (; p))  T   pq (; p)]	
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subject to the L constraint for the good doctor T + pq
 
; p
  C(q  ; p). When
reputational concerns are su¢ ciently high we have rE = 0 and the problem reduces to the
one solved under a pooling contract. Instead, when reputational concerns are su¢ ciently
low, then rE = 1 and we are back to the separating equilibrium.
Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 5. Let us express the ICT formally rst. Beliefs
fail the ICT if there exists some qh such that the following conditions simultaneously hold
(recall that in the pooling equilibrium there is neither reputation gain or loss):
V
 
q
 

 j| {z }
eq. payo¤
< V

qhj

+ (   E ())| {z }
Most fav. beliefs
, (22)
V
 
q
 

 j| {z }
eq. payo¤
> V

qhj

+ (   E ())| {z }
Most fav. beliefs
. (23)
It is useful to compute =, that is, the threshold for  above which the pooling
equilibrium arises, for the assumed functional forms and price. After substitution in
the denition of  (see equation (3) in Section 2) we obtain  =
1

1
4
c2
v2
 
 . We now
express conditions (22) and (23) for the assumed functional forms. Condition (i). At
price pP and q = q
 


, type  obtains non-reputational payo¤ V
 
q
 

 j = T +
c
 
1   v1 c2v2 + v1 v1 c2v2   v2 v1 c2v2 2   cv1 c2v2 . This types non-reputational payo¤ at
any other q > q
 


becomes V
 
qj = T + c  1   q+v1q  v2q2  cq. By inspection
of the expression for V
 
q
 

 j, the RHS of (22) decreases with q if q > v1 c2v2 = q  .
Therefore condition (i) can be expressed as q < qmax, where qmax solves (22) with equality.
Once expressions for V
 
q
 

 j and for V  qj are substituted in, the resulting equation
has two solutions, but only one of them yields q > q
 


, namely, qmax = q
 


+q
(1  )  v2 . Condition (ii). At p = p
P and q = q
 


, type  obtains non-reputational
payo¤ V
 
q
 

 j = T + c  1   v1 c2v2 + v1 v1 c2v2   v2 v1 c2v2 2  cv1 c2v2 . At any other
q > qo, type  obtains non-reputational payo¤ V (qj) = T +c  1   q+v1q v2q2 cq.
By inspection of the expression for V
 
q
 

 j, the RHS of (23) decreases with q if
q > v1 c

2v2
def
= q1. Recall however that we are considering q above q
 


. It is easy to
check that q
 


> q1. Therefore condition (23) can be expressed as q > qmin, where
qmin solves (23) with equality. Once the expressions for V
 
q
 

 j and for V (qj) are
substituted in, the resulting equation has again two solutions but only one of them yields
q > q
 


. Namely, qmin =
v1   c
2v2
+
r
c2
4

 
v2
2
+ (1  )  v2 . We now nd a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for (i) and (ii) to be compatible. Conditions (i) and (ii) and the
threshold for pooling. (i) and (ii) are compatible if and only if qmax > qmin. It turns out
that: (1) qmax  qmin is decreasing in  if and only  > 14 c
2
v2
1
1 
def
= ^. (2) qmax  qmin = 0
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at  =

 
c2
v2
1
1 
def
= : Notice also that  > ^ since 
  > 1 >
1
4 . Therefore, (i) and (ii)
are incompatible for all  > . This implies that OOE beliefs that support the pooling
equilibrium pass the ICT test for such . This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6. Formally, strategy ~q is such that
V (q () j)  (E ()  )| {z }
Separating Equilibrium payo¤
= V (~qj) + (   E ())| {z } :
Reputational gain under most favorable beliefs
(24)
We start by analysing ~q as dened in the last equation. Total di¤erentiation with
respect to  shows that ~q increases with . Indeed, @~q@ =
 ( )
V q(~q)
, where V q (~q) < 0 since
~q > q. Notice that, at  =  , the expression becomes (after simplication) ~q () = q
 


.
(For all    , one has the so called trivial separation, Cartwright and Patel, 2013).
Therefore, for  >  , the Riley Outcome is given by qE () =  and qE
 


= ~q > q
 


.
In words, as soon as  becomes larger than  , the high type has to set a higher quality
than his non-reputational optimum in order to avoid imitation. We now nd the Riley
Outcome under the same assumptions in Proposition 5. Solving (24) for ~q yields
~q =
1
2v2

2
q
v2
 
   + v1   c :
The high type obtains, if he sticks to the Riley Outcome, the best possible beliefs (since the
Riley Outcome is separating by denition). However, he is not setting his non-reputational
optimum q
 


if  > =. Therefore, the most favorable out-of-equilibrium belief to
sustain the Riley Outcome is that s
 
q
 


= . The next inequality is therefore a
necessary condition for the high type not to deviate to q
 


:
V
 
q
 

 j+ (   E ())| {z }
Worst possible reput.payo¤ (negative)
 V (~qj) + (   E ()):| {z }
Reput.gain under the Riley Outcome
(25)
This can be rewritten as V
 
q
 

 j V  ~qj       . (Incidentally, both sides of last
expression increase with . Indeed, ~q0 () > 0 and V
 j decreases with q when q > q <
~q. This is why it is impossible to know which e¤ect dominates without further assumptions
on V and
 
   ). Using the functional forms for W and C given in Proposition 5 and
using p = pP , (25) can be rewritten as  < RO where RO is given in the proposition.
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Figure 1. Expected qualities as a function of reputational concerns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Expected payoffs as a function of reputational concerns 
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FIGURES - 2 
 
 
Figure 3. Equilibrium type and the Intuitive Criterion, by proportion of good doctors (λ) 
and Intensity of reputational concerns (α) 
 
Figure 4. Equilibria and the Riley outcome, by proportion of good doctors (λ) and 
Intensity of reputational concerns (α) 
Notes: In Region A, the pooling equilibrium arises and is intuitive. Also the Riley outcome is a PBE. 
Therefore two PBE equilibria passing the ICT coexist in this region. In Region B, the semiseparating 
equilibrium arises but the Riley outcome is not a PBE. 
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